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During the 1990s there was an exponential increase inthe establishment of national human rights institutionsin Africa. As recently as 1989, only one African coun-
try had established some form of human rights monitoring
body. By the beginning of 2000, twenty-four African coun-
tries had provisions in their laws for national human rights
bodies. The United Nations and other funders in the inter-
national donor community have directly encouraged and sup-
ported, both technically and financially, the growth of these
institutions. The international community lends its support
because it considers the process of establishing national
human rights institutions to be an indication that a gov-
ernment is willing to abide by international human rights
norms. Also, African nations consider the establishment of
national human rights bodies to be integral to international
acceptance.
Many human rights activists are,
however, concerned that some of
these human rights bodies enable
abusive governments to cover up
human rights violations. Both non-
governmental and independent stud-
ies on the effectiveness of national
human rights bodies demonstrate
that an institution’s success depends
largely upon the existence and
strength of particular legal, financial,
political, and social factors. Such fac-
tors include whether democratic gov-
ernance exists and whether the insti-
tution is operationally independent
from the government. Despite these
findings, there is little correlation
between the funding and technical
support offered by UN entities and
international donors, and the actual
effectiveness of a human rights insti-
tution. Funding generally is available
to any country that expresses an inter-
est in establishing a national human rights body, regardless
of the institution’s likelihood of success.
It is questionable whether international funding is spent
wisely. Sierra Leone, for example, relied on international
funding to establish its national human rights body. The suc-
cess of Sierra Leone’s human rights institution has been
inconsistent. The ineffectiveness of human rights institu-
tions thus demonstrates that international funds and tech-
nical support can be used ineffectively and not carefully
implemented. Although continued international support
for African human rights institutions is vital, it is crucial
that such support not be given unconditionally. Rather, the
UN and international donors should carefully evaluate the
effectiveness of the entities they support.
National Human Rights Institutions
There are two types of national human rights institu-
tions: human rights commissions and ombudsmen. These
institutions have similar characteristics: neither institution is
judicial in nature nor has lawmaking abilities. Rather, both
institutions play an ongoing advisory role regarding human
rights matters, at both the national and international levels.
The main difference between the two institutions is that an
ombudsman’s primary role is to monitor human rights
abuses perpetrated by government entities, while a human
rights commission generally addresses the actions of pri-
vate entities and individuals as well as governmental conduct.
The International Community’s Role in Establishing 
Human Rights Institutions 
Throughout the past two decades, the international com-
munity has greatly increased its focus on establishing national
human rights bodies in Africa. Promoting these national insti-
tutions has emerged as one of the UN’s most important
strategies for improving the protection of human rights in
the region.
To promote these institutions effectively, the United
Nations created the Program of Advisory Services and Tech-
nical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights (Program
of Advisory Services) as early as 1955. In
1987, then-Secretary-General Javier
Perez de Cuellar established the Vol-
untary Fund for Technical Coopera-
tion in the Field of Human Rights (Vol-
untary Fund) with an eye toward
strengthening and supporting the work
of the Program of Advisory Services.
The Voluntary Fund was set up to estab-
lish and offer technical support to
national and regional institutions aimed
at implementing international stan-
dards of human rights at the local level.
The program currently offers its ser-
vices to governments that are consid-
ering, or are in the process of estab-
lishing, a national human rights
institution. The assistance that the Vol-
untary Fund provides includes train-
ing on effective investigation of human
rights violations, conflict resolution,
obtaining and managing resources,
conducting reviews and evaluations,
and drafting reports for UN treaty bod-
ies. A regular UN operating budget and private donations
fund the program. Since 1988, the program has received $19
million in pledges and contributions, indicating the wide-
spread support for its work. 
In 1991 the UN International Workshop on National
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights formalized UN assistance for national human rights
institutions. The workshop produced guiding principles
regarding the status, powers, and functioning of national
human rights institutions. In 1993, the UN General Assem-
bly endorsed these principles, which are known as the Paris
Principles. These principles constitute the fundamental
guidelines, which the UN uses to assist countries in estab-
lishing national human rights bodies. The guidelines enu-
merate the requisite factors for a human rights institution’s
effectiveness: (1) a founding constitutional or legislative
statute; (2) a broad mandate; (3) an independent appoint-
ments procedure, with terms of office specified by law; (4)
a pluralistic and representative composition; (5) regular
and effective functioning; (6) independence from the exec-
utive branch; and (7) adequate funding. Further, the Paris
Principles place particular attention on the need for human
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rights institutions to be empowered to make public statements
on their work.  
UN support has not been the only impetus for the rise of
these institutions. The creation of the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights, which came into effect in 1986,
specifically encourages “. . . the establishment and improve-
ment of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guar-
anteed by the present Charter.” The recognition of the need
for national institutions as well as the general changes in the
African political and social landscape and growing interna-
tional pressure have greatly increased the profile of human
rights issues within Africa. Increasingly, African governments
are realizing that international credibility is intimately tied
to improvements in their human rights records.
Advantages of Creating National Human Rights Institutions
International bodies often encounter problems related to
cultural relativism when they attempt to impose interna-
tional norms. Typically, the most effective education and
information campaigns are those that have been designed
and carried out at the national level
and are culturally sensitive. National
human rights institutions meet this
criteria. By supporting the creation
of these national human rights insti-
tutions, the international commu-
nity is able to work actively toward
improving human rights standards
without having to struggle with
designing and implementing a cul-
turally sensitive system for each
country. Further, by funding gov-
ernment-created institutions, the international donor com-
munity does not need to be concerned about funding NGOs
whose agendas might not be politically popular interna-
tionally or with the local government. 
For these reasons, national human rights bodies are an
appealing means of promoting human rights. Much of the
appeal lies in the inherent cultural sensitivity of the national
entities. The UN’s technical support, however, potentially
impedes the cultural sensitivity of the national institutions by
virtue of its generic nature. The Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights employs two assistance proce-
dures to help countries establish human rights bodies. The-
oretically, the first procedure—the technical assistance
program—integrates support for national institutions with
other forms of UN assistance.
The second assistance procedure is a Special Advisor on
national institutions, regional arrangements, and preven-
tive strategies, whose role is to provide technical assistance
to governments in both creating and supporting human
rights commissions. Special Advisors have enabled the UN
to acquire a wealth of comparative knowledge, which has been
used effectively in many countries. The Special Advisor assis-
tance procedure is not, however, without flaws. Because one
individual holds the position of Special Advisor, it is difficult
to obtain country-specific advice. It is unrealistic to presume
that one person could develop enough country-specific
knowledge for each country in which a Special Advisor oper-
ates. Consequently, a Special Advisor’s advice is often generic.
This problem could potentially be alleviated if the program
work of the technical assistance program and the country desk
officers were more integrated with the work of the Special
Advisor. 
Disadvantages of the International Community’s Support
for National Human Rights Institutions
The international community’s non-discriminatory dis-
tribution of assistance poses a substantial problem to the
development of effective human rights bodies. Under-
standably, the international community wants to encourage
concern about human rights not only in countries with good
human rights records, but also in countries with poor records.
Yet in practice, the even-handed approach actively supports
weak commissions with little attempt to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of these institutions or suggest how such institu-
tions might be more effective. One could easily construe this
international support as legitimizing weak human rights
commissions that operate to cover up serious governmental
abuses. According to Human Rights Watch, many national
commissions “. . . see [their] role as being a mouthpiece to
defend repressive government policies or to deny the exis-
tence of abuses.”
Moreover, the failure to criticize weak commissions car-
ries with it negative repercussions. Rather than passively
supporting government-established commissions that are
not always the most effective instruments for change, the
international community should be working actively to find
ways in which their support will be
most effective in bringing about
positive change in a country. The
Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, however,
appears to be extremely reluctant
to publicly critique weak human
rights commissions, although the
same office seems to criticize abu-
sive governments openly. It is dif-
ficult to discern the rationale
behind this reluctance. Conceiv-
ably, the High Commissioner may
feel that even an ineffective human rights institution exerts
pressure on a government that otherwise would not have
existed. By characterizing its support as such, the UN justi-
fies supporting the very existence of such an institution,
albeit a weak one. Further, the UN may be operating under
the notion that it is more palatable to criticize a foreign
government than to criticize one’s programming. Yet the fail-
ure to recognize and identify flaws precludes the possibility
of remedying and strengthening these institutions. Moreover,
the international community appears to lend legitimacy to
weak commissions. 
Additionally, it is problematic that international fund-
ing is not contingent on an institution’s effectiveness. Stud-
ies by both nonprofit organizations and legal scholars have
demonstrated that the elements enumerated in the Paris Prin-
ciples are vital to the creation of an effective national human
rights institution. There have, however, been few studies
regarding whether national institutions funded by the inter-
national community actually meet the criteria established by
the Paris Principles. Although the technical assistance pro-
gram works to help institutions meet the technical stan-
dards, they do not guarantee effectiveness in promoting
human rights. International funding should be tied to the
institution’s effectiveness in promoting human rights, thus
creating an incentive for effective human rights protection.
It is still crucial for the UN to support these national
institutions. Focusing attention on the creation of such
human rights institutions helps bring human rights issues to
the forefront of international affairs. It is also vital that the
international community refrain from passively supporting
ineffective government-established institutions.
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Sierra Leone 
Appalling human rights abuses occurred during Sierra
Leone’s eight-year civil war. Although both sides committed
atrocities, the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) per-
petrated the most serious abuses, which included summary
execution, systematic rape and enslavement of women, use
of civilians as human shields, abduction and use of child sol-
diers, wanton destruction of property, and limb amputa-
tion. The international community condemned the RUF’s
widespread human rights abuses.
The situation in war-torn Sierra Leone exemplifies the dire
need for a strong human rights institution. International sup-
port for institutions such as Sierra Leone’s human rights com-
mission have positive and negative effects. As with the polit-
ical situation, the stability of Sierra Leone’s human rights
commission has been tenuous. The predecessor to the cur-
rent commission, the National Commission for Democracy
(NCD), was established in 1994 by Sierra Leone’s then-mil-
itary government. The NCD’s independence, however, was
severely undermined by provisions in its founding decree,
which stated that the organization could only perform func-
tions determined by the ruling
party. Also, the NCD’s activities were
limited to promoting democracy,
educating the public about the
constitution, and encouraging
nationalism, patriotism, and loyalty
to the state. Accordingly, the NCD
undertook little human rights mon-
itoring, focusing almost exclusively
on the transition toward a multi-
party democracy. In 1996 the elec-
tion of President Ahmar Tejan Kabbah re-established demo-
cratic rule in Sierra Leone, and the NCD’s mandate was
modified to include human rights concerns. 
The re-named commission—the National Commission
for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR)—was estab-
lished on December 23, 1996. In May 1997, however, the
opposition Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
took power, suspended the constitution, banned political
activity, and announced rule by military decree, effectively
suspending the Commission’s work. The AFRC also joined
forces with the RUF. Their nine-month reign was charac-
teristically brutal and blatantly disregarded the rule of law.
In February 1998, the AFRC were ousted by the Economic
Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping forces, which re-instated
President Tejan Kabbah. A period of war followed, with
atrocities on both sides. In July 1999, the two sides —
ECOMOG and AFRC— signed the Lome Peace Accord.
Since the signing of the accords, the NCDHR has been in
a state of flux, with its fate being heavily debated even as
recently as early 2000. In its current state, the NCDHR lacks
fundamental functions to ensure independence, such as the
power to subpoena witnesses, and to compel documentation,
evidence, or records. The Commission also lacks the power to
institute proceedings or represent cases in a court of law.
Not surprisingly, the NCDHR is unable to rely on much sup-
port from the country’s government, which must rebuild a dev-
astated economy and thus has little to contribute. In 1998 the
Commission received a mere U.S.$6,300 from the govern-
ment, and since the war, it is unlikely the Commission will
receive more funding. Thus, the NCDHR has had to rely
heavily on funding from the international community. 
Funding and support from the international community
has been both effective and detrimental in Sierra Leone. The
international funding is targeted and aimed at specific pro-
jects or goals. For example, in 1998 the UN Development Pro-
gram (UNDP) awarded the NCDHR a U.S.$1.6 million grant
for a program entitled “National Awareness Raising Pro-
gram.” The program started prior to the signing of the
Lome Peace Accord and was aimed at increasing public sup-
port for the signing of the treaty. Since the signing in 1999,
the program has continued to educate the public about
basic human rights, and to increase support for the Lome
Accords. The program has been tremendously successful
in accomplishing its goals. 
There can be little question that the UNDP-funded
“National Awareness Raising Program” has been effective.
The effectiveness of the awareness program does, however,
have its costs: the monopolization of staffing and funds has
precluded the Commission from carrying out other pro-
grams. Members of Sierra Leone’s NGO sector complain that
although the program has been helpful in educating indi-
viduals about their rights, it has so overwhelmed the atten-
tions of the NCDHR staff members that they have been
unable to focus much attention on the documentation of
human rights abuses. In 1997 the Commission attempted to
establish monitoring committees to document human rights
abuses and advocate on behalf of
victims of human rights abuses.
The following committees were
proposed: police, prisons, women
and children, and a general com-
mittee. NCDHR even worked with
the UN Mission in Sierra Leone
to set up training for committee
members. Despite initial enthu-
siasm, the efforts fell apart largely
because of a lack of focus on the
part of the NCDHR staff. Appar-
ently, the NCDHR lacks the capacity to handle multi-oriented
programming.
As the situation in Sierra Leone demonstrates, it is criti-
cal that international support for national human rights
institutions be planned more effectively. It is also important
to consider the context in which the international commu-
nity lends its support: international support for NCDHR’s
work comes at a time when the organization still lacks many
of the powers that are necessary for the effective function-
ing of a human rights institution. Although supporting such
a weak institution seems counterproductive, entirely cut-
ting off international support for the NCDHR simply because
it is not as strong as it could be is the wrong response. The
international community might appropriately respond by
continuing to assist the NCDHR as it develops organiza-
tionally and structurally while simultaneously working with
local actors to ensure political stability in Sierra Leone. 
Second, international funding should be better coordi-
nated. While the UNDP was funding a large education project
in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone was assisting
with the establishment of human rights monitoring bodies. If
both projects were coordinated more effectively, the UN
would have realized that the NCDHR staff would be unable
to accomplish both tasks successfully. It was imperative, for the
success of the mission, for the UN to have developed an over-
arching strategy for human rights promotion in Sierra Leone.
As the experience of Sierra Leone’s commission demon-
strates, the international community must coordinate and
implement its strategies more carefully if it is to help establish
effective national human rights monitoring bodies.
continued on next page
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on mandates to study the broader context in which the
abuses occur and the structural elements of the govern-
ment, security forces, and society that make patterns of vio-
lations possible. Analysis and reporting that could guide
government policy would be particularly relevant regarding
the violations against women’s rights. 
A truth and reconciliation commission can serve an
important and necessary function in the nation building
process, particularly when there has been a stream of human
rights violations inflicted upon the population, as in
Afghanistan. This function is not a substitute for criminal
prosecution. In fact, a commission of inquiry into human
rights has worked well when implemented in tandem with
criminal proceedings by collecting testimony and docu-
menting abuses later used in criminal prosecution cases.
Jirga 
The traditional process by which Afghans have solved
issues ranging from local disputes to those of national impor-
tance has been through the Jirga (Assembly). Representatives
of tribes and communities gather to decide questions that
affect their families, villages, tribes, region, and nation.
Groundwork for a Jirga to address war crimes can be mod-
eled after the arrangement made by the Bonn Agreement for
the convening of a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). An inde-
pendent commission of twenty-one constitutional and cus-
tomary law experts has been charged with convening an
assembly for the purpose of selecting a transitional govern-
ment. Similarly, a commission of international and cus-
tomary law experts can be established to lay the framework
for accountability. Because representatives to the Jirga have
traditionally been male tribal elders, special attention will
have to be paid to the representation of women. One option
would be to establish a sub-commission to address the vio-
lence and abuses faced by women and girls.
Many advantages will result from domestic prosecution of
war crimes in an indigenous Afghan mechanism familiar to
the population. There will also be great need, however, for
outside support to ensure compliance with international
law standards. Because Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been
destroyed and its human and material resources depleted,
serious challenges exist for an exclusively domestic response.
Significantly, Annex II, point 6 of the Bonn Agreement
retains the right of the UN to investigate human rights vio-
lations and recommend corrective measures. The interna-
tional community, particularly those non-governmental orga-
nizations that have been monitoring and documenting the
situation in Afghanistan, can play an essential role as advi-
sors, experts, and investigators. 
Conclusion
It is indisputable that Afghanistan must address severe vio-
lations of humanitarian and human rights law. Such a course
of action must be taken immediately, as the threat of war
criminals entering the transitional government and poten-
tially destabilizing Afghanistan once again looms.
Each of the mechanisms discussed has an important role
to play in the effort to hold violators of humanitarian and
human rights law accountable while rebuilding Afghanistan.
Shared domestic and international cooperation is neces-
sary to criminally prosecute those responsible for the most
egregious violations, such as massacres. Non-criminal sanc-
tions can be employed to ensure that those culpable—even
if not prosecuted criminally—do not assume positions of
authority. A truth commission has the advantage of begin-
ning promptly and moving the country toward reconciliation,
as well as compiling a historical record to prevent the past
from repeating itself. Ethnic minorities and women must
receive adequate representation and attention in these pro-
ceedings, as they have faced some of the most systematic and
widespread violence. Although challenges exist to attain-
ing accountability, Afghanistan’s compliance with interna-
tional and customary law standards and its realization of
sustainable peace and reconstruction requires the new gov-
ernment to meet the challenge.
* Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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Conclusion
Despite numerous setbacks and uneven results in the
attempts of African nations to establish human rights insti-
tutions, there have been some positive developments, par-
ticularly within the last decade. Clearly, the increasing inter-
national commitment to the establishment of national human
rights bodies has raised the profile of human rights issues
within Africa, and has tied international legitimacy to the con-
tinent’s efforts to improve human rights protection.
On the other hand, the international community’s involve-
ment in the establishment of these commissions has not
always been an effective way of promoting or protecting
human rights. The advice and funding given is often generic
and not tailored to a country’s particular needs. Further,
there tends to be little coordination between the various fund-
ing sources. As in Sierra Leone, this lack of coordination often
results in development and support for only one successful
project at a time, but no effective overall strategy. 
The international community’s indiscriminate support for
all human rights commissions, regardless of their effective-
ness, might suggest support for commissions that blatantly
fail to expose or protect against human rights abuses. As
Afronet Online, an African NGO based in Zambia, remarked,
“. . . [i]t would seem that pronouncements made loudly at
appropriate fora, coupled with structures put in place by
African governments, are part of the grand deception of their
people (and the international community) to give an impres-
sion of the improving human rights record in their respec-
tive countries.” Clearly, the international community does not
want to be seen as supporting attempts to overlook or con-
ceal human rights abuses.
International donors and institutions must consider what
is needed to help countries develop institutions for the pro-
motion and protection of human rights. There is a need for
greater analysis of how international funding is being distrib-
uted, as well as the need for a more result-oriented process for
supporting effective national human rights bodies. 
* Mary Ellen Tsekos is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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